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Abstract. Many machine learning systems make extensive use of large
amounts of data regarding human behaviors. Several researchers have
found various discriminatory practices related to the use of human-
related machine learning systems, for example in the field of criminal
justice, credit scoring and advertising. Fair machine learning is therefore
emerging as a new field of study to mitigate biases that are inadvertently
incorporated into algorithms. Data scientists and computer engineers are
making various efforts to provide definitions of fairness. In this paper,
we provide an overview of the most widespread definitions of fairness in
the field of machine learning, arguing that the ideas highlighting each
formalization are closely related to different ideas of justice and to dif-
ferent interpretations of democracy embedded in our culture. This work
intends to analyze the definitions of fairness that have been proposed to
date to interpret the underlying criteria and to relate them to different
ideas of democracy.
Keywords: machine learning · fairness · equity · discrimination.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, machine learning systems make an extensive use of large amounts of
data on human behaviors, collected through various channels (e.g. social media,
apps, mobile phone usage, credit card transactions, etc.). The widespread resort
to these data for disparate purposes is rapidly transforming several domains of
our daily life. However, the increasing use of automated-software and machine
learning systems, for example in the field of criminal justice [2], advertising [25],
and credit scoring [15], is raising a wide range of legal and ethical issues. It is
obviously impossible to provide an exhaustive mapping of all the problems, but
through an easy expedient a useful logical scheme summarizing the various ones
can be supplied. As a matter of fact, if we move from one of the many elementary
definitions of “algorithm” - an encoded procedure to transform input (data) in
output (expected result) through a series of calculations - we understand that
we are confronted with three constitutive elements: 1) input ; 2) procedure; 3)
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output. A major concern in the first phase is the presence of biases in the input
dataset (this is not the only one: for example, personal data protection is also a
relevant issue). In the second phase, a largely debated issue is the transparency
and accessibility of the procedure - the problem of the black box [21]; while the
main problematic aspect of the third phase is the possible discriminatory effects
of the algorithmic decision. A given ethical and/or legal problem must be studied
with reference to: a) the phase in which it is mainly located, and b) the possi-
ble propagation of the issue throughout the algorithm’s elaboration path. Since
many application domains of machine learning algorithms are not protected by
law against discrimination, the attention of actors belonging to different sectors
is increasingly focusing on the way algorithms encode prejudices and lead to
disproportionate results [20]. As a further development of the emergence of ad-
verse outcomes, many researchers are involved in finding solutions to overcome
the problem of discrimination in automated software systems by embedding the
idea of fairness in the algorithm’s structure. In this paper, we contribute to the
debate on fairness in machine learning by discussing the impact that its recent
mathematical formalizations may have on societies. In particular, we reflect on
the meaning of each definition of fairness in relation to the different ideas of
democracy and equality they take with them. Our hypothesis is twofold: on one
side, we suppose different democratic cultures may foster the diffusion of dif-
ferent definitions of fairness; on the other side, the different ways of designing
machine learning tools fit in different ways in the various societies and may fit
better than others, especially because in a same social contexts various ideas of
democracy may coexist. We describe in Section 2 the role of fairness in the field
of machine learning; several recent mathematical implementations of fairness
and various democracy typologies are exposed and analyzed in Subsection 2.1
and Subsection 2.2, respectively. In Section 3 we discuss commonalities among
fairness definitions and democracy typologies, pointing out challenges and open
issues for the fair machine learning research domain. Finally, Section 4 draws
some conclusions and discuss potential future works on this topic.
2 Why fairness matters?
The way machine learning systems act is a crucial matter for our societies [20].
Algorithms are designed to recognize situations leading to satisfactory outcomes,
they are modeled to look for patterns and characteristics in individuals that have
historically brought to success, thereby not making things fair if randomly em-
ployed, but replicating models and past practices. A relevant example is the
recent case, exposed by the investigative website ProPublica4, about the COM-
PAS recidivism tool, an algorithm used to inform criminal sentencing decisions
by predicting recidivism. In particular, the study found that COMPAS is evalu-
ating useful risk factors for classification, such as socio-economic status and type
of crime, which share high covariance with some sensitive attributes, in this case
4 https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-
sentencing
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the race. Although the reason for this high covariance may be the result of a pre-
existing prejudice present in a wider system than one considered for the analysis
of recidivism , it should be underlined that the study found that COMPAS was
significantly more likely to falsely label as high-risk of recidivism black defen-
dants because of the above mentioned interaction, and to underestimate the risk
of white defendants by less accurately detecting the false negative rate. Although
research is increasingly concentrating in finding solutions to mitigate the segre-
gating effect of some algorithms, many efforts will have to be done to consider
when an algorithm fails, for whom it fails and what are the social costs of the
failure [9]. Hence, designing a fair algorithm entails two aspects, closely related
to each other: firstly, to evaluate the meaning of choosing one kind of fairness
instead of another in a certain society; and secondly, to assess the degree of
social acceptability subordinated to the context and to the selected fairness cri-
terion. Considering that more than one definition of fairness cannot be achieved
simultaneously [18], design choices have a relevant impact on the effect that the
algorithm’s outcomes will have on society. It is therefore quite relevant starting
to figure out which kind of societal values and democratic concepts are tied to
the current mathematical formalizations of fairness. In the following sections,
we analyze the most relevant mathematical definitions of fairness provided in
the machine learning research area, assuming that a decision on how to design a
fair machine learning system could be acceptable with more probability as much
as it corresponds to the ideas of democracy shaped by individuals in the social
context in which it will be used.
2.1 Fairness in machine learning domain
In the recent years, several formal definitions of fairness have been suggested
by the machine learning community. In Table 1, we report the most widespread
ones grouped by similar characteristics: in particular, the first column indicates
the name of the partitioning, while the second one the extended name of the
fairness definition. Finally, the third column contains scientific references which
are then further specified in Table 2.
First of all, we provide some mathematical notations that compose a typical
setup in a machine learning domain: X denotes the features of an individual;
Y denotes the target variable; A denotes a sensitive attribute (i.e. gender, race,
etc.); C denotes a classifier; S denotes a score function or a conditional expecta-
tion. For example, the frequency of an event given certain observed characteris-
tics can be written as S = E [Y |X ]; t is a threshold. In case of binary classifiers,
the score value causes the acceptance of classifier outputs when it is above t,
otherwise causes the rejection.
Then, we introduce and briefly describe the fairness definitions listed in Ta-
ble 1, supplied with examples regarding risk assessment in the criminal justice
domain. Individuals rated high risk of re-offending are classified by 0, otherwise
1 - that means low risk of recidivism. The variable race has been considered as
a sensitive and protected attribute.
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Partition Definition Reference
Group Statistical [1, 3, 9]
fairness parity
Accuracy [10]
parity
False positive [5, 7]
parity
Positive rate [4, 11, 12]
parity
Predictive parity [6, 7]
Predictive value parity [3]
Equal [4, 7, 9]
opportunity
Equal [4, 7]
threshold
Well-calibration [2]
Balance for [2]
positive class
Balance for [2]
negative class
Individual [1]
fairness
Counterfactual [9]
fairness
Preference-based Preferred treatment [8]
fairness Preferred impact [8]
Fairness through [1, 4, 9]
unawareness
Table 1. Fairness in machine learning literature
Group fairness. Below, we introduce several formal definitions of group fairness.
Statistical parity. Classifier C satisfies statistical parity if Pa(C = 1) = Pb(C
= 1) for all groups a, b - i.e. a = black, b = white. This means that both black
and white people should have equal probability to be classified as low risk.
Accuracy parity. Classifier C satisfies accuracy parity if Pa(C = Y) = Pb(C
= Y) for all groups a, b. This means that both black and white people should
have equal probability to be correctly classified as low risk, if belonging to actual
low risk rate, and correctly classified as high risk, if belonging to actual high risk
rate.
False positive parity. Classifier C satisfies false positive parity if Pa(C = 1|Y
= 0) = Pb(C = 1|Y = 0) for all groups a, b. This means that both black and white
people with actual high risk rate should have equal probability to be incorrectly
classified as low risk (False Positive Rate).
Positive rate parity. Classifier C satisfies positive rate parity if Pa(C = 1|Y
= i) = Pb(C = 1|Y = i), i ∈ 0, 1, for all groups a, b. This means that both
black and white people should have equal probability to be incorrectly classified
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Reference Paper
number
[12] [1]
[18] [2]
[2] [3]
[15] [4]
[9] [5]
[24] [6]
[7] [7]
[28] [8]
[19] [9]
[10] [10]
[27] [11]
[4] [12]
Table 2. References
as low risk - False Positive Rate - and to be correctly classified as low risk (True
Positive Rate).
Predictive parity. Classifier C satisfies predictive parity if Pa(Y = 1|C = 1)
= Pb(Y = 1|C = 1), for all groups a, b. This means that both black and white
people with low risk predicted score (Positive Predictive Value) should have
equal probability to really belong to the low risk class.
Predictive value parity. Classifier C satisfies predictive value parity if (Pa(Y
= 1|C = 1) = Pb(Y = 1|C = 1)) ∧ (Pa(Y = 0|C = 0) = Pb(Y = 0|C = 0)) for all
groups a, b. This means that both black and white people with low risk predicted
score (Positive Predicted Value) should have equal probability to really belong
to low risk class, and both black and white people with high risk predicted score
(Negative Predictive Value) should have equal probability to really belong to
high risk class.
Equal opportunity. Classifier C satisfies equal opportunity if Pa(C = 1|Y =
1) = Pb(C = 1|Y = 1) for all groups a, b. This means that both black and white
people with actual low risk rate should have equal probability to be incorrectly
classified as high risk (False Negative Rate). Since mathematically a classifier
that satisfies False Negative Rate equity satisfies at the same time True Positive
Rate equity, the definition also implies that both black and white people with
actual low risk rate should have equal probability to be correctly classified as
low risk.
Equal threshold. Classifier C satisfies equal threshold if Pa(Y = 1|S = s) =
Pb(Y = 1|S = s), s ∈ [0, 1], for all groups a, b. This means that both black and
white people should have equal score threshold t under which they are classified
at low risk, and above which they are classified at high risk.
Well-calibration. Classifier C satisfies well-calibration if Pa(Y = 1|S = s) =
Pb(Y = 1|S = s) = s, s ∈ [0, 1], for all groups a, b. This means that both
black and white people with the same score should be treated comparably “with
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respect to the outcome, rather than treating black and white people with the same
score differently based on the race group they belong to”[18].
Balance for positive class. Classifier C satisfies balance for positive class if
Ea(S|Y = 1) = Eb(S|Y = 1), for all groups a, b. This means that both black and
white people with an actual low risk rate should have the same expected value
assigned by the classifier C (a classifier uses the characteristics of individuals to
identify which class - or group - they belong to). That is to say, it should not
happen that the scoring process is “systematically more inaccurate for negative
cases - high risk score - in one group than the other”[18].
Balance for negative class. Classifier C satisfies balance for negative class if
Ea(S|Y = 0) = Eb(S|Y = 0), for all groups a, b. This means that both black and
white people with an actual high risk rate should have the same expected value
assigned by the classifier C. That is to say, it should not be that the scoring
process is ”systematically more inaccurate for positive cases - low risk score - in
one group than the other”[18].
Individual fairness. Given a set of individuals V and a set of outcomes A =
{0, 1}, and considering a metric on individuals d: V x V → R and randomized
mappings M: V→ ∆A, individuals fairness is achieved if a randomized classifier,
mapping individuals to distributions over outcomes, minimizes expected loss
subject to the (D,d)-Lipschitz condition of D(Mx, My) ≤ d(x, Y) [12].
This means that two individuals are similarly classified if they are considered
similar with respect to a particular task, such as to pay off a debt with a bank.
Counterfactual fairness. Classifier C satisfies counterfactual fairness if P(CA←a
(U5) = y|X = x, A = a) = P(CA←a′ (U) = y|X = x, A = a). That is, given a
set of attributes (education level, type of crime, drugs problems and protected
attribute A = race) and an outcome Yˆ to be predicted (recidivism), a graph
is counterfactually fair if race is not directly linked to Yˆ through any other
attributes.
Intuitively, this means that a decision is fair towards an individual if it is the
same in (i) the actual world and (ii) a counterfactual world where the individual
belonged to a different demographic group (i.e. white instead of black).
Preference-based fairness. Here, we introduce new formalization of fairness [28]
that are inspired by the concepts of fair division in economics and game theory
[26,3].
Preferred treatment. Classifier C satisfies preferred treatment if Ba(Ca) ≥
Ba′(Ca′), for all a, a’ ∈ A6. This means that the preferred condition is preserved
if each group obtains more benefit from their own classifier then it would be
assigned from any other classifier. In other words, both black and white people
5 ”U is a set of latent background variables, which are factors not caused by any vari-
able in the set V of observable variables”[19]
6 Ba is the fraction of beneficial outcomes received by users sharing a certain value of
the sensitive attribute a[28]
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should prefer “the set of decisions they receive over the set of decisions they
would have received had they collectively presented themselves to the system as
members of a different sensitive group”[28].
Preferred impact. Classifier C satisfies preferred impact if Ba(C) ≥ Ba(C’),
for all a ∈ A. This means that the preferred condition is preserved if a classifier
C, with respect to any other classifier, assigns at least the same benefit for all
groups. In other words, both black and white people should prefer “the set of
decisions they receive over the set of decisions they would have received under
the criterion of impact parity”[28].
Fairness through unawareness. Classifier C satisfies fairness through unaware-
ness if X: Xa = Xb → Ca = Cb for both individuals a, b. This means that for
example the attribute race should not be used to train the classifier and thus to
take a decision (i.e. granting or not a loan).
2.2 Fairness and democracy
In order to understand which idea of fairness can be affirmed in a certain society,
it may be useful to relate it to the type of democracy in force within the latter.
In this way, we may reflect on the concept of equality that this idea of demo-
cratic life brings with it. As the philosopher Christiano writes [8], democracy
is a procedure for taking collective decisions characterized by the fundamental
equality of those who participate in it. According to Bozdag and Van Den Hoven
[6], there are at least four different ways of conceiving democracy, which must
be seen as some sort of ideal types, that interact and confront each other in
reality, giving rise to the different democratic regimes in force in the world. The
first is the model of liberal democracy, commonly centred on the defence of fun-
damental rights and freedoms (i.e. self-determination, choice, private property,
expression, etc.) from all forms of coercive power [11], [16]. It is an individual-
istic vision of democratic life, according to which democracy must be the place
that preserves the freedoms of the individual, characterizing itself as a procedure
which, through electoral competition and voting, represents and aggregates the
will of individuals. In this case, the criterion of justice on which the concept of
equality between persons is based denies the maxim of egalitarianism, according
to which all men must be (at the very least) equal in everything, but admits
the equality of all only in something, that is, in the so-called fundamental rights
[5, p. 95]. The second model is that of deliberative democracy [6], seen as a way
of taking collective decisions, based on a confrontation between free and equal
citizens. This confrontation must be aimed at finding logical solutions to satisfy
the good of all. Here, the emphasis is less on the individual and more on her/his
participation in common life. Democracy is not seen as the mere aggregation of
the will of individuals in a vote, but as a place where people can talk to each
other, make their points of view count and try to understand, together, which is
the best one. The fulcrum of all this is the exercise of a rationality, in a certain
sense, devoid of the will to affirm partisan interests, which is very similar to the
rationality theorized by Habermas [14] and Rawls [22], [23]. In this case, equality
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is above all in the possibility of having access to the deliberative process and in
ensuring that one can confront others, even if s/he is part of a minority. The
third model of democracy is what Bozdag and Van Den Hoven [6] call repub-
lican or protesting. It is based on the idea that all citizens must be free from
the arbitrary exercise of power by someone. For this reason, they must be able
to control the activity of those who govern them, being at the same time able
to challenge it. More than the consensus of deliberative democracy, therefore,
in this case it is fundamental the power to challenge choices and points of view
that are not shared. It is very important the transparency and publicity of the
actions of the rulers, and it is essential that anyone can question them, in a way
that can produce some effect. This is the kind of equality that the supporters of
this model of democracy are aiming for. The fourth model is that of competitive
democracy [17]. It logically contrasts with that of deliberative democracy, be-
cause its proponents do not believe that people, by confronting and using pure
rationality, can reach an agreement on the common good. Often, the positions
of each one are based on passions, partisan interests, instances that one does not
want or cannot negotiate. Democracy, then, must consist of a set of procedures
that allow the supporters of the various positions to express themselves and to
confront each other, in order to prevail. This must be done knowing that the
opponents, having lost a confrontation, will have the opportunity to assert their
demands in future occasions. Equality, in this case, is similar to the one exist-
ing in a competitive context, in which the participants have, at the beginning,
the same opportunities to assert themselves. It is defined, in fact, as equality of
opportunity [5, p. 24-26]. To these four models, however, it is necessary to add a
fifth that we could define as egalitarian democracy, following Bobbio’s reasoning
[5, p. 26-38]. It is based on the ideal of guaranteeing a de facto equality which,
as Bobbio himself writes (ibidem, p. 27), is economic equality. In practice, egal-
itarian democracy tries to reduce the distance between those who have less and
those who have more, with equalizing mechanisms such as progressive taxes,
subsidies to the poor, and so on. Hence, the principle on which it is based is
the opposite of that of competitive democracy, in the sense that its proponents
recognize the differences between people rather than what they have in common,
and try to favor those who are disadvantaged.
3 Results
In the previous section we exposed the most widespread fairness criteria formal-
ized in the machine learning domain, observing that the achievement of fairness
is subordinated to various probabilistic constraints, each of them related to one
or more parts which an algorithm is composed of (see Section 1). The connection
among machine learning approaches and democratic structures similarly exists:
as well as fair parameters can be encoded both in procedure and in algorithms’
outcome, even democratic values can be accomplished both in procedural and
in outcome part of a decision. Therefore, as we show in Figure 1, selecting a
fairness criterion instead of another is a trade-off process where the decision-
maker is called upon to determine if the achievement of the desired goal entails
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preserving parity (all individuals are equal on the basis of some protected at-
tributes) or satisfying preferences (individuals may have different preferences
independent from protected attributes), and if it has to be reached by means of
procedure constraints or impact factors. In other words, should the algorithm
be fair in the way it takes a decision or should the decision be fair itself? The
first column refers to the practice of preserving a kind of equality among peo-
ple, while the second one refers to the practice of satisfying preferences; rows
indicate in which part of an algorithm the fairness criteria are embedded and if
inequality is mitigated from the beginning or in a second phase. The following
partitioning (Figure 1), inspired by Gajane and Pechenizkiy [13] is the result
of our reasoning, which is explained in details for each democracy type in the
following subsections.
Parity Preferences
Procedure
Counterfactual fairness
Fairness through unawareness Preferred treatment
Outcome Group fairness
Individual fairness
Preferred impact
Fig. 1. Trade-off in fairness selection process related to democracy typologies. Legend:
Competitive (green), Liberal (yellow), Egalitarian (orange)
Liberal democracy Liberal democracy is a model based on self-determination and
preservation of individual freedom. Analyzing the mathematical formulation of
individual fairness, we believe that such a notion of fairness underlies an idea of
liberal democracy; in fact, even though attention is paid to protect minorities’
rights, individual diversity is chiefly preserved in preferential way, considering
individuals not because of an intrinsic differentiation but rather because of some
different tasks for which they are similarly treated.
Competitive democracy This kind of democracy expresses the idea that actors
cannot reach an agreement among themselves on a specific result by reason of
utility; this reasoning implies the condition occurring when allocation of goods
is such that it is not possible to improve the condition of one actor without
worsening the condition of another one. So the best that can be done is guaran-
teeing equality of opportunity among groups through preserving and protecting
minorities’ rights. Therefore, from the point of view of competitive democracy,
the mechanism of satisfying preferences could be seen as considering like a game
which each individual should have the same opportunity to play. In this sense,
almost all the fairness definitions that we have reported reflect the competitive
democracy criteria; in fact, the majority of them encodes the idea that all people
should have the same possibility of being correctly classified (i.e. each individual
should have the same opportunity to receive a loan if s/he deserves it). From
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a statistically point of view, fairness definitions clustered in the group fairness
partition are not substantially very different, the disparity mainly consists on
the observer’s point of view, or rather the stakeholder’s; i.e., in statistical parity
we assume the society’s point of view that wonder ”Is the selected set demo-
graphically balanced?”; in false positive parity we assume the defendant’s point
of view that wonder ”What is the probability that I’m incorrectly classified as
high-risk?”; in predictive value parity we assume the decision-maker point of view
that wonder ”Of those I have labeled at high risk, how many will be recidivists?”.
Egalitarian democracy This type of democracy is inspired to Bobbio’s notion of
distributive egalitarianism, intended as a way of redistributing material resources
between advantaged and disadvantaged people [5, p. 30-38]. But if we extend
the idea of redistribution also to political resources, knowledge, etc., then we
can apply it to the fairness criteria we have reported. In fact, no definition of
fairness completely fulfills egalitarian democracy criteria, but preference-based
models are the closest ones; in fact, both definitions of preference-fairness refer
to the concept of benefit, which as expressed in the definition of Zafar et al. [28]
is very similar to the concept of favoring individuals belonging to minorities. We
exclude republican and deliberative democracy from the general classification
reported in Figure 1. The problems that are faced, when reflecting on the re-
publican model of democracy, are usually touched, within the ethics of data and
algorithms, when referring to the issues of transparency and accountability of
computer tools. Since the attention mainly focuses on monitoring who exercises
the power and on controlling the decisions, we believe actually the whole general
ground of fair machine learning has been inspired by republican democracy val-
ues. But none of the definitions of fairness we have reported have directly to do
with transparency and accountability, which have to be considered as the results
of the whole fairness process.
Instead, deliberative democracy is a model based on agreement and on the
idea that all individuals are free and equal to each others, when having the
possibility of seeing their instances represented and taken into consideration in
the contexts where decisions about them and their lives are taken. Its ethical
premises are very similar to the ones of competitive democracy. In fact, strong
attention is given to preserve minorities’ rights and to give everyone equal pos-
sibilities to participate to the game of democratic debate. But once again, we
think none of the fairness definitions we have reported has directly to do with
guaranteeing that democratic decisions are taken acknowledging the instances of
everybody. Moreover, we believe at the present the field of fair machine learning
still lacks fairness definitions built on egalitarian democratic principles. In fact, if
almost all fairness definitions are to some extent based on the principle that ev-
eryone should have equality of opportunities, egalitarian democratic definitions
can be considered in contrast to this principle, because they rely on a sort of an
inequality principle, according to which a disadvantaged individual must be fa-
vored over others. Criteria relating to most of the fairness definitions are linked
to competitive democracy which may be a following stage of the egalitarian
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democracy, because competitive democracy rules, according to which everyone
should have the opportunity to fairly participate at the competition, can be
better implemented if inequalities are previously resolved through a distributive
logic.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
Over the last decade machine learning has radically changed the way we take
a decision. Many researchers studied the performances of statistical models and
human judgments, demonstrating how in some circumstances models based on
machine learning have surpassed those based on human judgments ([1]). More-
over, by now machine learning algorithms are well known to use a large-amount
of data to induce a particular rule starting from a generalized datum; in this
article we have addressed problems related to the correctness of these rules. The
examples enhancing machine learning models have in fact shown how often the
results reflect bias and human prejudices in different contexts - especially those
in which we try to reproduce and analyze human behavior. Hence, several efforts
have been devoted to finding solutions that re-calibrate balances in outputs of
machine learning systems. However, the debate around fairness the in machine
learning domain displays a profound and relatively worrying lack: although re-
searchers are acting and reacting in a positive and proactive way, data scientists
and computer engineers are increasingly involved in taking decisions that affect
individuals, operating as judges in decision-making processes and constituting
a sort of invisible power - although in a positive way - whereas society at large
should play this role. In this article, we enrich these efforts and the related de-
bate, highlighting that meanings of fairness, underlying to statistical constraints,
and the democratic values are strictly connected; in fact, we carry on the idea
that the spread of one fairness definition instead of another is highly justified by
the ideas of justice and democracy shared among the society in which the above-
mentioned fairness criterion is selected. We consider this qualitative analysis as a
prelude of quantitative researches. For example, our study may pave the way for
the implementation of an agent-based model that mimics the decision-making,
where agents are informed by different kind of democratic values. The aim of the
model would be to analyze which statistical parameters lead to specific fairness
criteria and under which probabilities. Moreover, we plan to further develop our
work by proposing a new formalization of fairness based on egalitarian demo-
cratic principles.
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